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STEVENS V CITY OF CANNON BEACH:
DOES OREGON'S DOCTRINE OF CUSTOM FIND
A WAY AROUND LUCAS?
Melody F Havey
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oregon Supreme Court recently issued an en banc decision in
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach' affirming a court of appeals decision
to dismiss plaintiffs' claim of inverse taking. In so doing, the court
confirmed its holding in State cc rel. Thornton v. Hay2 that a public
easement for recreation exists in the dry sand areas of the state's beaches
under the doctrine of custom. The Stevens court stated that because
custom as applied to Oregon's ocean shores3 merely enunciates the
"background principles of ... the law of property,"4 its decision
comported with the United States Supreme Court holding in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.'
Lucas is the most recent in a long line of Supreme Court "takings"
decisions.6 In that case, the Court applied what it termed a "second
categorical rule"7 and held that confiscatory regulations, those "[w]here
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1995.
1. 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, No. 93-496, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2238, 62
U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1994).
2. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
3. The term "ocean shore" is defined in OR. REV. STAT. § 390.605(1)(1991) as the
land lying between extreme low tide of the Pacific Ocean and the line of vegetation.
4. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 456 (quoting Lucas v. So.
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992)).
5. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
6. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution stipulates, in part, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This portion of the Fifth Amendment is known as the Takings Clause.
7. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at2893, n.6 (quoting Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-296; and Agins v.
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the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economi-
cally beneficial uses in the name of the common good, ... "8 were per se
takings and required compensation. The Court qualified this categorical
rule, however, and declared that it would not be applied when the
"proscribed use interests were not part of [the property owner's] title to
begin with. 9
Decided just one year after Lucas, the Stevens case appears to test
the same constitutional question. A major distinction between the cases,
however, is in the method that each state used to assert public rights in
otherwise privately owned property. South Carolina relied solely upon
its police powers to proscribe certain "harmful uses" of coastal property
through enactment of the Beachfront Management Act.'" In contrast, the
Oregon court affirmed the public's rights in the state's shorelands by
finding that under the doctrine of custom the public always had a right
to use the dry sand area of Oregon's beaches." Under this theory, the
statutes encompassed in Oregon's "Beach Bill"'2 serve only to codify the
limitations which "inhere in the land," by virtue of state property law,'3
and do not "newly legislate] or decree[]"' limitations on property
rights.
Whether the doctrine of custom is a state property law that can
withstand constitutional scrutiny is the subject of this Note. The search
for answers to this inquiry begins with a review of the doctrine of
custom, both through its common law history and a survey of the more
recent decisions on the subject. The Note then analyzes Oregon's
doctrine of custom and the application of this doctrine in light of the
Supreme Court's takings analysis in Lucas.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The first categorical rule established by the
Supreme Court was that a regulation compelling a property owner to suffer "physical
invasion" of his property constituted a per se taking requiring compensation. Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (New York law requiring
landowners to allow cable companies to install permanent cable facilities in their
apartment buildings was a taking).
8. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2895.
9. Id. at 2899.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
11. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 677.
12. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 390.605 -.770 (1991).
13. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 456.
14. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2900.
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Look at Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Two years prior to South Carolina's 1988 enactment of its Beach-
front Management Act,"5 the petitioner in Lucas had paid nearly $1
million for two parcels of land, with the intention to develop them for
residential purposes. Provisions in the Act subsequently identified the
land as lying in a "critical area," 6 a designation which absolutely
precluded the erection of any permanent, habitable structures on the
property. 7
In response to petitioner's claim for taking without just compensa-
tion, the trial court found that the ban on construction "deprived Lucas
of any reasonable economic use of the lots, ... eliminated the unrestricted
right of use, ... and render[ed] them valueless." 8 Based on this finding,
the court awarded damages. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed, determining that the Act was "properly and validly designed to
preserve ... South Carolina's beaches"' 9 and that petitioner's proposed
construction would threaten this public resource. Therefore, the court
ruled that no compensation was owing.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that although:
the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property
to be restricted ... by the State in legitimate exercise of its
police powers ..... [t]he notion ... that title is somehow held
subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subse-
quently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with ... the Takings Clause.'
The Court further stated that a "limitation so severe [could] not be newly
legislated or decreed ... but must inhere in ... the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property ... already placed
upon land ownership."2" The case was remanded to the South Carolina
15. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
16. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2889.
17. S.C. CODE § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
18. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2890.
19. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
20. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2899.
21. Id. at 2900.
1994]
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court to determine whether such restrictions in fact existed prior to the
passage of the contested legislation. Only under such circumstances
could the restriction be upheld without compensating the petitioner.
B. The Doctrine of Custom
The doctrine of custom? has been recognized in English common
law, since at least the early 17th century, as vesting a property right in
the land for the benefit of a local community. 3 Once an easement was
created by custom, it became appurtenant to the land and the rights of
the members of the locality were established in English property law.24
Creation of an easement by custom required that the custom "must have
continued from time immemorial, without interruption, and as a right;
it must be certain as to the place, and as to the persons; and it must be
certain and reasonable as to the subject matter or rights created. "'
Very few cases have been litigated in the United States concerning
the doctrine of custom. Several early cases recognized the existence of
custom as a possible means of creating property rights,' but based on the
facts of those cases, the doctrine was not applied. A few states have
rejected the doctrine as not being suitable to the conditions that exist in
this country.2 Not until the Oregon court's decision in State ex rel.
22. For an interesting and comprehensive overview of this doctrine, see generally,
Lew E. Delo, The English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property Law: State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 4 ENv. L. 383 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Gateward's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 344, 345 (K.B. 1607), Rowles v.
Mason, 123 Eng. Rep. 892 (C.P. 1612) (finding that the difference between prescription
and custom was that custom was not to be alleged in a person, but in the land).
24. Tyson v. Smith, 112 Eng. Rep. 1265 (Ex. 1838).
25. See 3 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 935, at 623 (3d ed. 1939).
26. Perley v. Langley, 7 N.H. 233 (1834) (a habit of residents to remove seaweed
from a local beach could only give rise to a profit i prendre, not a customary right);
Littlefield v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 134 (1850) (the public as well as an individual may
acquire a right of way by custom).
27. Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98 (Conn. 1905) (rejecting doctrine as unadaptable
to conditions of political society existing in that state); Gilles v Orienta Beach Club, 289
N.Y.S. 773 (1935) (rejecting doctrine because this country does not have the same
ancient history as England, thus protection against lost records, an integral purpose of
the English doctrine, is not needed here); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093
(Idaho 1979) (rejecting custom because public use only went back to 1912, not "time
immemorial").
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Thornton v. Hay did an American court specifically vest property rights
using a custom theory.29
In more recent years, the doctrine has been affirmatively adopted in
Hawaii, 30 Texas, 3' and the U.S. Virgin Islands.32  Additionally, the
doctrine of custom has been supported by several commentators as. a
legitimate method for declaring public rights in otherwise private coastal
property.33
C. The Oregon Law: State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay and Beyond
The seminal case for the doctrine of custom in Oregon is State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay.' In that case, landowners were enjoined from
building fences or other improvements on their land between the ordinary
high tide level and the vegetation line because such action violated the
Oregon Beach Bill.' The trial court found that the public had gained
28. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
29. One Hawaii case, In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968), has been cited by
some commentators as authority for the doctrine of custom. That case received little
support in the Hawaiian court system because of its particular facts, and has not been
followed.
30. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982) (finding right for
native Hawaiians to enter private property for purposes of gathering bamboo, kukui nuts,
etc., has been established by custom).
31. Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1024 (1987). Interestingly, Texas stands alone by actually incorporating the doctrine
of custom into its Open Beaches Act. 2 Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 61.024 (West
1978).
32. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F.Supp. 769 (D.V.I.
1974), aff'd without op., 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding that property owner's
rights have always been subject to the paramount right of the public to use the sand
beach as established by custom).
33. See Commentary, Easements: Judicial andLegislative Protection ofthe Public's
Rights in Florida's Beaches, XXV U. FLA. L. REv. 586, 592 (1973) (urging adoption of
the custom doctrine by Florida Legislature as the "best judicial remedy"); See, generally
Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and
the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REv. 627, 644 (1989) (public's long customary use of the
[dry sands] arguably has resulted in its acquisition of customary rights).
34. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
35. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 390.605 -.770 (1991) (the portion of the Bill which
plaintiffs violated, § 390.640(1, 3) stated in pertinent part "[ulnless a permit therefor is
granted.... no person shall make an improvement on any property lying seaward of the
[vegetation line]." Vegetation line is defined in § 390.770 as that "land located along the
Pacific Ocean between the Columbia River and the Oregon-California boundary between
1994]
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rights to the dry sand through meeting the criteria of an easement by
prescription.36
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, but finding that prescriptive
easements "applied only to the specific tract of land before the court, and
[that] doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-
by-tract litigation,"37 the court searched for a broader basis upon which
to decide the case. Noting that the subject lands are sui generis, and that
they had been "used by the public according to a unbroken custom run-
ning back in time as long as the land had been inhabited, "38 the court
chose as the "better legal basis"39 the English common law doctrine of
custom.
40
While recognizing that this doctrine had little support in American
law,41 the court concluded that an absence of precedent did not "militate
extreme low tide and the lines of vegetation ... established by the United States Coast
and Geodetic Survey of 1947").
36.
In Oregon ... an easement by prescription can be created in favor of one person
in land of another by uninterrupted use and enjoyment of land in a particular
manner for the statutory period, so long as use is open, adverse, under claim
of right, but without authority of law or consent of owner.
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 675-76.
37. Id. at 676.
38. Id. at 676-77.
39. Id. at 676.
40. Id. at 676-78. The court found two definitions of custom upon which to base
its conclusion that the public use of Oregon's beaches met the requirements for this
doctrine. First, BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY which defined custom as "such a usage as
by common consent and uniform practice has become the law of the place, or of the
subject matter to which it relates." Second, the court paraphrased BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES and found that a custom could be recognized as law by being 1) ancient,
or used so long that memory of man runneth not to the contrary; 2) exercised without
interruption; 3) peaceable and free from dispute; 4) reasonable; 5) certain; 6) obligatory,
not left to the option of the landowner; and 7) the custom must not be repugnant or
inconsistent with other law. In his argument in favor of granting review, Justice Scalia
criticizes the Oregon court's analysis of these requirements, finding it "remarkable" that
the discussion of the doctrine "took less than one full page of the Pacific Reporter" and
claiming that the Oregon court misread Blackstone when "it appl[ied] the law of custom
to the entire Oregon Coast." Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, No. 93-496, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS, at *12 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 677. The Oregon court cited only
one instance where an American court had referred to custom as a property law concept.
Perley et ux. v. Langley, 7 N.H. 233 (1834). In that case the New Hampshire court
stated that "a mere easement ... may be claimed by custom," but rejected plaintiffs
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach
against the validity of a custom when the custom does in fact exist."42
Further, the court noted that "[t]he rule in this case, based upon custom,
is salutary in confirming a public right, and at the same time it takes
from no man anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as
exclusively his."43
Shortly after the Thornton case was decided, the Oregon Supreme
Court had an opportunity to reconsider the validity of the custom
doctrine. In State Highway Commission v. Fultz,' the court reviewed a
circuit court decision that the public had acquired a recreational easement
in the ocean shore by means of implied dedication or prescription.
Determining that "oceanfront lands from the northern to the southern
border of the state ought to be treated uniformly, "' the court found that
Thornton was dispositive of the issue and that the doctrine of custom
applied.'
Subsequent cases, however, served to limit the Thornton holding.
In State v. Bauman47, the court refused to extend the theory of custom
to create a public easement in sand dunes lying landward of the
vegetation line, even though the public had been using such property as
a recreational area.' More recently, in McDonald v. Halvorson,49 the
court held that the doctrine of custom would not apply to lands unless
they actually abutted the Pacific Ocean.5' Thus, the public did not have
claim that a profit a prendre may be so claimed.
42. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 678.
43. Id.
44. 491 P.2d 1171 (Or. 1971) (a quiet title action and a challenge to that section
of the Beach Bill which allowed the State Highway Commission to deny a permit to build
a road and a revetment across the ocean shore).
45. Id. at 1172 (quoting State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 676).
46. Id. at 1173.
47. 517 P.2d 1202 (Or. App. 1974).
48. Finding that the owner's attempt to block the public's use, through posting no
trespassing signs and fencing in the property, failed the test of continuity, and that no
other properties "similarly situated" were used as recreational areas, the court determined
that the requirements of custom as adopted by the Oregon court had not been met. State
v. Bauman, 517 P.2d at 1206. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for explanation
of the required components of the doctrine.
49. 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989).
50. Id. at 715. The contested property in the case was separated from the ocean
by a rocky sill, an elevated portion of land that provided only a narrow opening to the
ocean. The geological landscape created a "cove" that was mostly fresh water, fed by
fresh water streams upland of the subject property. Although the cove was occasionally
influenced by ocean waters (at high tide some seawater would flow into the cove), the
1994]
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a recreational easement in a small beach on the landward side of a mostly
inland cove because the location did not "suggest any likelihood of
consistent utilization by ancient inhabitants."51
III. STEVENS V. CITY OF CANNON BEACH
A. Facts
Plaintiffs Stevens owned two vacant lots in the dry sand area of the
city of Cannon Beach, Oregon. They applied to the city for a permit to
construct a seawall as a first step toward construction of a motel or hotel.
The lots had been zoned by the city for residential or hotel use, but parts
of them were subject to an Active Dune and Beach Overlay Zone,52
which required plaintiffs to obtain a city building permit prior to
construction.
The overlay zone was created to implement a portion of the Oregon
Land Conservation and Development Commission's (LCDC) Statewide
Goal 18 which limited development on beaches and active foredunes 3
In addition, since the lots were part of Oregon's ocean shore, the
plaintiffs were required to apply for a building permit from the Oregon
Parks and Recreation Department prior to development.54  The
defendants in the case were the City of Cannon Beach and the Parks and
Recreation Department, both of which had denied plaintiffs' permit
requests.
court found that it was not an intertidal pool, and therefore, was not part of the ocean.
Id. at 723. Justice Scalia erroneously implies that the McDonald decision should have
been controlling in Stevens. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, No. 93-496, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS 2238, at *6 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The McDonald decision focused on whether
the disputed land was "similarly situated" with that to which, based on the ruling in
Thornton, the doctrine of custom applied. The Oregon court ruled that the land was not
similarly situated, and, therefore, the doctrine of custom could not apply to vest rights
in the public to use that land. Stevens, however, involved land which was almost
identical to the land in dispute in Thornton (both properties were on Cannon Beach), so
the Oregon court had no reason to apply the limiting ruling of McDonald.
51. McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d at 724.
52. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 451 (citing ZONING ORDINANCE
OF CANNON BEACH 79-4A, § 3.180).
53. Id. at 458.
54. ORE. REv. STAT. § 390.640 (1991). See supra note 35.
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The plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging that
the permit denials resulted in "as applied"' takings of private property
for a public purpose in violation of the Fifth Amendment. They also
alleged that LCDC Goal 18 was unconstitutional on its face because it
"denie[d] [plaintiffs] economically viable use of [their] land."56
The trial court dismissed both of plaintiffs' claims for uncompensated
takings. It found that since plaintiffs were not denied permission to build
a hotel, but rather were denied the ability to construct a seawall, their
"as applied" takings claim would failY In addition, the court found that
since Goal 18 made provisions for certain economically viable uses of
private beaches and dunes, no facial taking could have been effected.5"
B. Arguments
On appeal, plaintiffs presented two arguments supporting their
position. First, they claimed that since the ruling in Thornton allows the
State to deny them the ability to develop their land, and thus all viable
economic use, it conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas.
Plaintiffs also contended that even if Thornton were still viable, its
holding could not be applied to them because they had acquired their
property before the court's 1969 decision in that case.
Defendants responded by asserting that Lucas allows the State to
resist compensating property owners when the proscribed use interests
were not part of the title to begin with, and that under the Oregon
property law of custom, the plaintiffs never had the right to develop the
property in such a way as to interfere with the public's right to use the
ocean shore. Further, defendants argued that Thornton did not create a
new legal principle, but merely applied an existing one; that is, the
principle of easement by custom grounded in Oregon property law.
Thus, defendants argued, there could be no retroactive application to
plaintiffs' property.
55. An "as applied" taking describes a situation where a statute effects a taking of
a particular property by preventing the owner's desired use of that property.
56. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2893.
57. Id. at 459.
58. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 459.
1994]
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C. Disposition
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims. Finding support in both Thornton59 and
Lucas,6 the court confirmed that the "bundle of rights" that plaintiffs
owned did not include the right to exclude the public from the ocean
shores. Since this right never existed under Oregon property law,
plaintiffs could have no claim for compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. In arriving at its conclusion, the court undertook a
thorough discussion of Thornton, reaffirming its commitment to the
doctrine of custom as a basis for determining ownership rights under
Oregon property law.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Oregon court's analysis in Stevens seems to bypass the questions
the Supreme Court usually asks when deciding takings cases, such as: is
the Oregon Beach Bill a regulation that "goes too far?"6 does it
"deprive[ property owners of all economically viable uses of land?"62 or
does it effect a "physical invasion"63 of the property? By concluding that
the doctrine of custom, as a state property law, has created an easement
in the public to use the ocean shore beaches, Oregon has apparently
found the "background principles of property law"' needed to protect
itself against a takings claim under Lucas.
The Lucas Court expressly limited its holding to those cases where
the state has attempted to regulate land use under "new" principles.'
Throughout its opinion, the majority stated that if the state's property law
had already precluded the activity banned by legislation, there would not
be a taking. The Court "assuredly would permit the government to
assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the
59. "Thornton is directly on point." Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d
at 453.
60. "[P]roscribed use interests were not part of plaintiffs' title to begin with." Id.
at 460.
61. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
62. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
63. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 438.
64. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2901.
65. Id. at 2900.
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landowner's title. "I Focusing such exceptions on limitations that "inhere
in the title itself," the Lucas Court made it clear that it would defer to
"existing rules or understandings that stem from ... state law to define
the range of interests that qualify for protection as "property" under the
Fifth ... amendment]." '67
"The very first issue in a 'takings' case, to use the [Supreme]
Court's own words, is for owners to identify those interests that 'were
... part of [their] title to begin with,' those things included in 'the
"bundle of rights" that they acquire[d] when they obtained title.' "68
Current Oregon property law, arguably since Thornton, definitely since
the subject case, would, under the doctrine of custom, define that bundle
of rights as absent the right to exclude the public from Oregon's ocean
shore. The Stevens decision therefore, seems to fall directly within the
exception the Supreme Court carved out of Lucas.
The question remains, however, whether the adoption of this
doctrine as "recently" as 1969,69 could be viewed by the Supreme Court
as a "newly decreed" change in Oregon property law. Part of the
Supreme Court's concern in Lucas appears to be that South Carolina
tried to change longstanding property law in the face of "changing
66. Id. at 2900.
67. Id. at 2901 (citations omitted).
68. Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself. The Impact of the Lucas
Case on Western Water Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 944 (1993), quoting Lucas v.
So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2889. Professor Sax's article, while
reviewing the impact of the "property" portion of the Lucas holding on water rights of
western states, offers a thoughtful analysis of Justice Scalia's use of property principles
as a basis for the decision in that case.
69. Most of Oregon's beachfront properties were originally sold under patents
which gave the grantees a fee simple estate in the upland property. In Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), the Supreme Court held that landowners claiming under
federal patents owned seaward to the high water line, then thought of to be the vegetation
line. That definition was later clarified in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296
U.S. 10, 26 (1935), to extent the upland owner's property rights to the mean high tide
line. The Thornton court, when addressing this apparent inconsistency, stated "the Borax
decision had no discernible effect on the actual practices of Oregon beachgoers and
upland property owners," and dismissed its impact on the right of the public to enjoy the
dry sand areas because no question about the upland owner's rights had been before the
court. State ex reL Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 674. In addition, the court found that
"the custom ... to use the dry sand as a public recreation area [is] so notorious that notice
of the custom ... must be presumed." Id. at 678.
1994]
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conditions," without regard to the owner's rights in the property.7' As
demonstrated in Lucas, legislation which by itself tries to redefine such
rights, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.7 Is judicial adoption of
a doctrine which defines ocean shore property as having customarily
been absent an "important stick out of the bundle,"' the right to exclude
the public, sufficient to protect the state from a takings claim?73
At first blush, it appears that Oregon has taken all the necessary
steps to meet the constitutional requirements of Lucas, and can avoid
compensating landowners when it declares a public easement in Oregon's
ocean shores. The State has not claimed public rights in its beaches
simply by legislating for the public interest or public "good", but has in
fact found a basis in its property law from which to make the determina-
tion that the public has always had a right to use the beaches.
This basis, the "background" of Oregon law, is the common law
doctrine of custom. The use of custom as a method for claiming an
easement, while relatively new in this country, has been a part of the
background of law for hundreds of years. In Oregon, the public has
freely exercised the right to use the dry sand "according to an unbroken
custom running back in time as long as the land has been inhabited. "74
Thus, the method of declaring that the public has an easement in the
ocean shores of Oregon through the doctrine of custom should meet
Lucas requirements. Under the principle of that doctrine, the State can
70. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2902 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
71. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (a state cannot be
permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due
process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has
taken never existed at all) (Stewart, J., concurring).
72. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 433.
73. Justice Scalia finds that the Stevens' claim for violation of their due process
rights is a "serious" one because they owned their property prior to the decision in
Thornton. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, No. 93-496, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2238, at
*14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The due process claim is out of place, however, so long
as the doctrine of custom is considered part of the background principles of Oregon
property law. A finding that the doctrine applies would indicate that the property owner
never had the right to exclude the public from the ocean shores, and, therefore, that
nothing has been taken which would require consideration of due process rights. Unless
the Supreme Court invalidates Oregon's use of the doctrine of custom, or finds that its
application requires an element-specific review, the Stevens' due process claim can have
no merit.
74. State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d at 677.
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legitimately claim that the right to exclude the public from Oregon's
ocean shores never "inhered in the title to begin with."I5
In addition, the Oregon court's willingness to define and delimit the
scope of the easement, sometimes to the detriment of the public, should
lend additional credence to the doctrine as a legitimate state property
concept.76 The Oregon court has not arbitrarily determined that all of
Oregon's beaches are encompassed under the doctrine. In fact, after the
McDonald decision, one commentator expressed concern that the viability
of the doctrine as a means to public rights in the ocean shore had been
severely curtailed.77 By clearly limiting the scope of the easement to
include only those ocean shores which definitively meet the requirements
of custom, the court has developed a state property law doctrine which
should withstand constitutional scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
The Oregon court was correct in stating that the Stevens decision
complies with the requirements of Lucas. To ensure protection against
constitutional attack, however, Oregon should specifically acknowledge
the custom doctrine in its state statutes.78 Currently, Oregon statutes
recognize that easements for public use can arise by "dedication,
75. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. at 2900. See supra note 7
and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia interprets these
limitations as "vacillations on the scope of the doctrine of custom [that] make it difficult
to say how much of [Oregon's] coast is covered." Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
No. 93-496, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2238, at *11 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To the
contrary, the Oregon court's rulings in McDonald and Stevens demonstrate clearly the
limits of the public's rights to use the ocean shores; the doctrine of custom applies when
the land "abuts the Pacific Ocean" and when the land is "similarly situated." A holding
by the Oregon court that the public had acquired an easement in all beaches along the
Oregon coast, without such limitations, would appear much more deserving of Justice
Scalia's criticism. The McDonald court explicitly stated that it "did not retreat from
anything [it] said in [State ex reL Thornton v.] Hay." McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d
at 724.
77. Erin Pitts, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring Continued Public
Use of Oregon Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731, 738 (1992) ("taken as a whole, the
[McDonald] opinion leaves the continued exercise of customary rights open to question").
78. One State, Texas, has already done so. See, e.g., 2 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. § 61.024 (West 1978) ("none of the provisions of this subehapter [Access to Public
Beaches, § 61.011] shall reduce, limit, construct, or vitiate the definition of public
beaches which has been defined from time immemorial in law and custom").
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prescription, grant ... or otherwise."79  While the term "otherwise"
would encompass an easement by custom, it does not readily convey the
strong acceptance of that doctrine that exists in the State. In light of the
Supreme Court's current attitude towards takings, the acknowledgment
seems notably absent.
79. OR. REv. STAT. 390.610(2) (1993 Supp.).
